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Abstract—The popularity of cloud based Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) solutions is becoming increasingly popular. 
However, since IaaS providers and customers interact in a 
flexible and scalable environment, security remains a serious 
concern. To handle such security issues, defining a set of security 
parameters in the service level agreements (SLA) between both, 
IaaS provider and customer, is of utmost importance. In this 
paper, the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) guidelines are evaluated to extract a set of security 
parameters for IaaS. Furthermore, the level of applicability and 
implementation of this set is used to assess popular industrial and 
open-source IaaS cloud platforms, respectively VMware and 
OpenStack. Both platforms provide private clouds, used as 
backend infrastructures in Industry 4.0 application scenarios. 
The results serve as initial work to identify a security baseline 
and research needs for creating secure cloud environments for 
Industry 4.0. 
Keywords–Cloud Computing; IaaS; Service Level Objective; 
Security; ENISA; VMware; OpenStack 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today’s working environment is affected by continuous 
and rapid change, cost saving aspects and the need for 
flexibility. This influences social as well as technical 
environments. Cloud computing offers possibilities to handle 
the technical challenges while being steadily developed. It is 
defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) as a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction. The three cloud service delivery models according 
to NIST are: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a 
Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [1].  
The focus of this paper lies on IaaS, which represents the 
fundamental building blocks for cloud services. IaaS is 
composed of highly automated and scalable compute resources, 
complemented by cloud storage and network capability, which 
can be self-provisioned, metered, and available on-demand [1]. 
This is also used to provide private clouds, which can have 
impact on industry, where cloud computing is a part of the 
proposed concept for the 4th industrial revolution, referred to 
as Industry 4.0. In particular in this domain stakeholder built on 
dedicated infrastructure rather than on public clouds. Dedicated 
infrastructure can be based within a trusted providers premises 
or independent divisions in large enterprises.  
The cloud servers and their corresponding resources offered 
by IaaS providers can be accessed via dashboards or APIs. 
Furthermore, IaaS customers have direct access to their servers 
and storage. This implies higher order of scalability and lower 
investment in capacity planning, physical maintenance and 
management. Compared to other cloud computing models, 
IaaS is the most flexible, which allows automated deployment 
of servers, processing power, storage, and networking. IaaS 
customers have true control over their infrastructure, compared 
to customers of PaaS or SaaS services. Thus, IaaS is the most 
used cloud service model, respectively by cloud service 
providers and customers [2].  
As stated above both, IaaS providers and users, interact in a 
flexible and scalable environment. To handle organizational 
and legal aspects, SLA are set up to define clear Service Level 
Objectives (SLO), to measure the service performance and to 
deal with security issues, which can be very difficult to define. 
Therefore, measurable security related SLOs are needed to give 
a clear definition of the covered security aspects. To address 
this issue towards a security base line for IaaS platforms in an 
Industry 4.0 environment, the ENISA guidelines are used to 
extract measurable security related SLO metrics. The 
measurable security related SLOs act as an input to assess 
popular industrial cloud platforms, which provide a lot of 
features, and to assess popular open source cloud platform, 
which provide a number of customized services. In this paper, 
the platforms considered for assessment are the VMware 
vCloud Suite and OpenStack. Moreover, both are compared to 
highlight the main differences concerning security related 
SLOs.  
Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold:  
• first, we identify a set of topics that still require 
research and development and  
• secondly, we provide a comparison of popular 
industrial and open-source platforms focusing on 
private cloud environments, which are important 
for Industry 4.0 use cases. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Related research work has shown the correlation between 
security standards and SLAs for cloud infrastructure. For 
instance, the benefits and costs of introducing SLA matching 
mechanisms for cloud infrastructures are discussed in [3], but 
there is no explicit focus on security and IaaS in Industry 4.0 
environments. Besides that, in [4] the main security concerns 
and solutions are identified, while [5] presents security and 
privacy requirements referring to ISO, NIST and CSA. To 
show the applicability of these three standards, Hoehl [6] 
compares their service models, whereas the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) analyzed the current 
standards and guidelines concerning cloud security in [7].  
Within these papers, security related SLAs are defined and 
discussed generically. The focus lies on the contractual 
relationship between the cloud service provider and the 
customer and the specified responsibilities between them. 
Another outcome of these papers is defining common metrics 
for measuring security service levels. Rathbun [8] shows the 
importance of security metrics and answers general questions 
addressing the reasons for having security metrics. Based on 
this outcome, it is possible to generate the essential information 
concerning cloud security assessment for our research work. 
The CSA has published a new version of the Cloud 
Controls Matrix. An overview of all common standards and 
legal publications concerning cloud computing, including 
ENISA, ISO, NIST, BSI and more are mentioned in [9]. These 
metrics give an overview of the current state of the art 
concerning the offer of security standards and guidelines within 
cloud computing, but no platform’s assessment. 
Other related work assesses IaaS solutions such as [2], 
where security vulnerabilities from inside and outside 
concerning OpenStack are discussed, but without the 
consideration of ENISA guidelines.  
The related work mentioned above consists of general 
information about security metrics, guidelines and standards as 
well as comparative aspects between them. Furthermore, it 
includes the assessment of different cloud computing offers. 
This paper relies on ENISA guidelines for monitoring of 
security in cloud contracts (PRO-SEC) [10]. Based on this 
guideline the extraction of ENISA specific needs regarding 
SLOs from the cloud service provider’s point of view are 
discussed. This paper focuses on the analysis of the 
applicability and implementation of the extracted security 
SLOs on the industrial software suite VMware vCloud and the 
open source software services of OpenStack. The comparison 
of both analyses shows the main differences concerning 
security of both solutions.  
To the best of our knowledge, no publication was identified 
that evaluates IaaS solutions based on ENISA criteria, 
comparing VMware to OpenStack cloud platforms.  
III. SECURITY RELATED BASELINES 
In the area of security, a variety of standards and guidelines 
concerning cloud computing are in place. This section, gives a 
brief overview of these standards and guidelines. 
A. International Organization for Standardization 
The ISO standards cover a wide spectrum of topics which 
are generated out of market needs. Security is covered by the 
ISO 2700x family, which provides an overview and explains 
the Information Security Management Systems (ISMS), 
referring to ISMS family of standards with related terms and 
definitions. The most relevant standards of ISO 2700x family 
addressing cloud computing security are listed below: 
• ISO/IEC 27001 focuses on the requirements for 
Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) 
[11]  
• ISO/IEC 27002 provides guidelines and general 
principles for organizations and their ISMS [12] 
• ISO 27017 generally focuses on the protection of the 
in-formation in the cloud services and is built upon 
the existing security controls of ISO 27002. 
 
The ISO 2700x family provides a set of security criteria and 
addresses also cloud technologies such as, ISO 27017. 
Therefor it provides a comparable basis for the further 
extraction of security criteria within the ENISA guidelines. 
B. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  
NIST is responsible for developing information security 
standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for 
federal information systems. The most relevant guidelines of 
NIST addressing cloud computing security are listed above: 
• NIST Special Publication 800-53 provides as set of 
security controls which fulfill the security 
requirements based on organizations, business 
processes and information systems, including a risk 
management framework. Additionally, it provides a 
set of security controls [13]. 
• NIST Special Publication 800-144 provides an 
overview of public cloud computing and guidelines 
for protecting security and privacy [14]. 
 
The NIST publications provide comparable security 
controls and the setup of the NIST Cloud Computing Program 
(NCCP) stands for further development in this area.  
Nevertheless, within this research work the status quo in the 
year 2016 is taken into account. 
C. Cloud Security Alliance 
The CSA security guidance working group provides 14 do-
mains about critical areas of cloud computing and works on 
continuous improvement of the published best practice 
methods concerning security. The CSA itself is member 
driven and provides best practice efforts. 
D. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Infromationstechnik 
The BSI Germany provides catalogues concerning IT 
Security Management and golden rules for application. These 
catalogues mainly have an organizational view on security and 
no direct recommendation for the evaluation of IaaS offers. 
The BSI provides minimum information security requirements 
for Cloud Service provider. 
E. European Commision Guideline 
The European Commission (EU) has published in 2014 the 
“Cloud Service Level Agreement Standardization Guideline” 
(C-SIG). This guideline focuses on the international orientated 
standardization of the contractual relationship between a cloud 
service provider and a cloud service customer. EU aims to 
make it easier for cloud services customers to compare cloud 
services offered by different providers by using standardized 
SLAs. Using a standard set of metrics in a cloud SLA makes it 
easier and faster to define the SLA. This also simplifies the 
task comparing one cloud SLA to another. The SLOs covered 
in C-SIG are: (i) Performance SLOs, (ii) Security SLOs, (iii) 
Data Management SLOs, and (iv) Personal Data Protection 
SLOs. The definition of SLOs in C-SIG relies on standards 
and guide-lines produced by organizations such as ENISA, 
NIST or ISO/IEC. 
F. European Network and Information Securtiy Agency 
ENISA is defined as a center of expertise for cyber security 
in Europe, build up in 2004. The agency’s role is to guide 
experts towards security solutions that are adapted to the needs 
of the internal market. Therefore, the development of security 
approaches and solutions that are interoperable across the 
whole EU is one of the agency’s aims. In general, guidelines 
and recommendations published by ENISA are quite unknown 
within the ITIL community.  
In contrast to ISO, NIST, CSA and BSI, ENISA focuses on 
the European market and is not a member driven organization 
such as CSA. In the comparison of the standards, none of them 
includes unique criteria. Moreover, the standards have many 
similarities in the provided criteria. Due to that fact that ENISA 
criteria refers to guidelines and standards mentioned above, the 
criteria is not very different. Procure secure (PRO-SEC) [10] is 
a guideline, which concentrates on the reporting and alerting of 
key measurable parameters, as well as a clear understanding of 
how to manage the customer’s own responsibilities for 
security. This customer centric approach provides the basis for 
understanding security risks, which in combination with 
measurable parameters shows the special focus of ENISA. Due 
to these aspects, ENISA is used to extract a set of security 
related SLOs described in the following section.  
IV. ENISA EVALUATION 
As mentioned before, ENISA has published a guide for 
monitoring security including service availability and 
continuity in SLAs (PRO-SEC) [10]. This security monitoring 
framework defines the following parameter groups (P.G.): 
• Service Availability (SA) 
• Incident Response (IR) 
• Service Elasticity and Load Tolerance (SELT) 
• Data Life Cycle Management (DLCM) 
• Technical Compliance and Vulnerability 
Management (TCVM) 
• Change Management (CM) 
• Data Isolation (DI) 
• Log Management and Forensics (LMF) 
 
Table I lists the ENISA P.G.s, together with a short 
description, a possible monitoring solution and a set of 
software-defined-datacenter (SDDC) applicable security 
related SLOs which have been extracted from C-Sig [15]. A 
SDDC is a data storage facility where all elements of the 
infrastructure, networking, storage, CPU and security are 
virtualized and delivered as a service. The entire process from 
deployment to monitoring and automation of the infrastructure 
is abstracted from hardware and implemented in software. 
Typically, the core architectural components that comprise a 
SDDC include the following [16]: (i) Computer virtualization 
(compute), (ii) Software-defined storage (SDS), (iii) Software-
defined network (SDN), and (iv) Management and automation 
software (business logic layer - BLC).  
In the next section, the applicability and implementation of 
this set of security related SLOs within VMware’s SDDC and 
OpenStack is discussed. 
TABLE I.  ENISA P.G. AND SECURITY RELATED SLOS 
P.
G
. Description (D) &  
Monitoring (M) Security related SLOs 
SA
 
D: clearly defines when a 
service is considered available 
and which functions and 
services are covered by 
availability monitoring. 
M: log examination running 
service health-checks using 
monitoring tools 
SA01 Service uptime 
SA02 Percentage of successful 
requests 
SA03 Percentage of timely 
service provisioning requests 
SA04 Average response time 
SA05 Maximum response time 
SA06 Level of redundancy 
SA07 Service reliability 
IR
 
D: relates to how a cloud 
service provider responds to 
and recovers from incidents.  
M: collecting log data about 
time related events, e.g. 
incident reporting 
IR01 Support hours 
IR02 Support responsiveness 
IR03 Average resolution time 
per incident severity 
SE
L
T
 
D: reflects the automatic scale-
up/scale-down of resources 
(compute, network, storage) 
over a given period of time and 
is linked to SA.  
M: burst tests or real-time 
monitoring of the affected 
resources, CPU cores and 
speed, memory size or network 
bandwidth 
SELT01 Number of 
simultaneous services 
SELT02 Maximum resource 
capacity 
SELT03 Service throughput 
SELT04 Automatic load 
balancing 
SELT05 Ratio of failed 
resource provisioning requests 
to the total number of resource 
provisioning requests over a 
commitment period. 
D
L
C
M
 
D: defines the provider’s data 
handling practices, for example 
backup and restore strategy, 
replication and data export or 
data loss prevention.  
The SDDCs DLCM relies on 
backup or snapshots integrity 
checks or restoration speed 
durability. The deletion of data 
and reporting of data-loss-
prevention systems can be 
included. 
M: backup time stamps and 
backup/restore durations 
DLCM01 Data mirroring 
DLCM02 Data 
backup/snapshot  
DLCM03 Data backup 
frequency 
DLCM04 Retention time 
DLCM05 Maximum data 
restoration time 
DLCM06 Percentage of 
successful data restorations 
DLCM07 Data deletion type 
T
C
V
M
 
D: measures the ability of a 
service to comply with a 
technical security policy and 
the handling of vulnerabilities. 
Regular scans of all affected 
systems can be used. 
Additionally, mailing lists 
and/or public vulnerability 
reporting programs should be 
included. 
M: Monitor the time between 
vulnerability discovery and 
patch/fix appliance in relation 
to the class 
TCVM01 Percentage of timely 
vulnerability corrections 
TCVM02 Percentage of timely 
vulnerability reports 
TCVM03 Reports of 
vulnerability corrections 
C
M
 
D: monitors critical changes in 
security relevant properties of 
the system, for example the 
loss of certifications or major 
system upgrades. It relies on 
time-related change 
management processes and 
triggers or the time to 
implement security-related 
change requests.  
M: using the main-stream 
supports duration, count 
applicable security-related 
certifications 
CM01 Critical software change 
reporting notifications 
CM02 Percentage of timely 
software change notifications 
CM03 Software security 
related certificates 
D
I 
D: covers discrete access to a 
shared pool of resources by 
legitimate users for legitimate 
purposes and must be present at 
all time.  
Additionally, cryptographic 
quantitative metrics can be 
included, for example key 
lengths or hash algorithms. 
M: penetration tests 
DI01 User authentication level 
DI02 Authentication 
DI03 User access storage 
protection 
DI04 Cryptographic brute force 
resistance 
DI05 Key access control policy 
L
M
F 
D: covers the access to 
information about historical 
events related to the usage of 
the service allocated to the 
customer 
M: regular randomized tests of 
log availability 
LMF01 Log access availability 
LMF02 Log retention period 
V. ASSESSMENT OF IAAS PLATFORMS 
This paper focuses on the comparison of two well-known 
IaaS cloud platforms, industrial and open source, concerning 
security related SLOs. Therefore, the VMware vCloud Suite 
will be assessed and compared with the OpenStack software, 
including its components and services, based on security 
related SLOs extracted from the ENISA guideline.  
A. VMware 
VMware is one of the world’s leading suppliers for x86 
server virtualization infrastructure [17]. This paper uses 
VMware’s cloud management platform vCloud Suite.  The 
VMware vCloud Suite (vCloud) includes VMware’s industry 
hypervisor vSphere and vRealize, the hybrid cloud 
management platform for providing a SDDC [18]. VMware’s 
vCloud Suite comprises virtualization technologies for 
computing, network, storage and management tools for 
providing SDDC capabilities to the customer.  
Within this section the assessment of the applicability and 
implementation of extracted security related SLOs for each 
P.G., as listed in Table I, is described. The assessment 
addresses the following three VMware products: (i) the free 
hypervisor vSphere Hypervisor (ESXi), (ii) the industry 
hypervisor vSphere Suite (vSphere), and (iii) the whole 
VMware vCloud Suite (vCloud). 
SA: ESXi offers an interface for monitoring the Service 
Availability. The measurement of response times (SA04) or 
redundancy (SA06) is not possible. vSphere and vCloud 
provide measurement and reporting tools for these parameters. 
IR: ESXi is a free hypervisor, but does not offer SLO 
related support for Incident Response. In short, for ESXi this 
parameter is not applicable. vSphere and vCloud have different 
support contracts addressing this parameter.  
SELT: ESXi allows a manually scale-up and scale-down of 
resources for virtual machines. Service elasticity or (automatic) 
load tolerance is not available. vSphere and vCloud support 
service elasticity and load tolerance for both, the virtual 
machine and the underlying hardware. High availably is also 
provided by vSphere and vCloud. Tenant specific resource 
management, capacity and performance management 
(SELT04. SELT05) are provided by vCloud only. The 
measurement of resources is available in all three products 
(SELT03). 
DLCM: ESXi does not provide access to the storage API. 
This API is used by backup applications for snapshot 
management. Therefore, ESXi does not offer DLCM. 
Snapshots are available in all three products (DLCM02), both 
vSphere and vCloud provide comprehensive measurement and 
reporting tools regarding this parameter. 
TCVM: In general hotfixes and patches are available for 
all three products. The Security Response Policy offered by 
VMware states the correction of security issues in a timely 
fashion (TCVM03). Integrated patch management is provided 
by vSphere and vCloud, compliance measurement is provided 
by vCloud only. 
CM: ESXi does not offer tools regarding software change 
management. Major upgrades are installed manually. vSphere 
offers basic tools regarding change management, like software 
deployment tools for upgrades. vCloud provide comprehensive 
measurement and reporting tools supporting software change 
processes (CM01). 
DI: ESXi does not provide DI in a multi-tenant 
environment. vSphere uses pools for data isolation within one 
security boundary. vCloud offers data isolation in a multi-
tenant environment. All three products use secure connections 
for resource access. Different types of user authentication and 
user rights management (DI01, DI02) are offered by vSphere 
and vCloud only. 
LMF: ESXi offers basic log access (LMF01). vSphere and 
vCloud provide Log Management, supporting different 
formats, achievement and access on user basis.  
To avoid redundancy, the results of the analysis of the 
applicability and implementation of ENISA parameters on 
VMware are only presented in the comparison in Table III. 
B. OpenStack 
OpenStack is an open-source platform for cloud computing 
providing IaaS. The platform consists of separate modules, 
where each offers a specific service, and acts as a software-
defined-datacenter. The interaction of all OpenStack services 
enables a high integration to provide IaaS within SDDC. 
Within this section the assessment of the applicability and 
implementation of extracted security related SLOs for each 
P.G., as listed in Table I, is described. 
SA: A single-controller high availability mode, which is 
managed by the services that manage highly available 
environments, is supported by OpenStack (SA01). Redundant 
controllers for failovers are not configured (SA06).  
IR: Currently not applicable on OpenStack. 
SELT: Load balancing as a service (SELT04) is offered by 
Neutron. Furthermore, Octavia provides additional capabilities 
for load balancing (including the usage of compute drivers to 
build instances which operate as load balancer). 
DLCM: Cinder services can be used for management of 
volumes and snapshots (DLCM02) for use with the Block 
Storage API. The self-service API supports end users to 
request and consume resources. 
TCVM: OpenStack offers a vulnerability management 
process, but the manual installation of hotfixes and patches by 
root is necessary (TCVM03). 
CM: OpenStack architecture and processes are 
documented on the community webpage, but there is no 
automatism to inform the cloud service customer (CM01). 
Furthermore, there are no supporting change management 
services within OpenStack. 
DI: OpenStack provides a separation of tenants. With the 
implementation of OpenStack’s Identity API, Keystone 
provides API client authentication, service discovery and 
distributed multi-tenant authorization (DI02).  
LMF: OpenStack provides standard logging levels 
depending on increasing severity. The possible levels are 
“debug”, “info”, “audit”, “warning”, “error”, “critical” and 
“trace”. Horizon offers the dashboard for the end user, with 
limited access to the content of the log-files (LMF01). A Log 
Management Data Flow by Monasca is provided. 
To avoid redundancy, the results of the analysis of the 
applicability and implementation of ENISA parameters on 
OpenStack are only presented in the comparison Table III. 
C. Results and Discussion 
To compare the applicability of SLOs, as described in the 
previous sections, the following grades have been defined: 
TABLE II.  GRADES OF APPLICABILITY 
Grade Applicability of SLO 
F The SLO is fully applicable and natively implemented.  
P 
The SLO is implemented, but cannot be used without 
additional administrative tasks, e.g.: a feature is natively 
implemented, but needs to be installed manually (partially 
applicable and implemented). 
N The SLO is not applicable or not implemented. 
 
After assessing both VMware and OpenStack, these grades 
have been used to point out whether the applicability and 
implementation of ENISA security P.G.s were fully applicable 
(F), partially applicable (P) or not applicable (N). Table III 
summarizes the results of the comparison:  
TABLE III.  COMPARISON OF APPLICABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ENISA PARAMETER GROUPS BETWEEN OPENSTACK AND VMWARE 
PRODUCTS 
ENISA  
parameter group OpenStack 
VMware 
vCloud vSphere ESXi 
SA P F F P 
IR N F F N 
SELT F F P N 
DLCM P P P N 
TCVM P F P P 
CM P F P N 
DI F F P N 
LMF P F F P 
 
As presented in Table III, the results of the analysis show a 
high level of applicability and implementation of ENISA 
SLOs in VMware’s vCloud Suite. Nearly all ENISA 
parameters are fully covered by vCloud. The major gap is the 
lack of Data Loss Prevention. In contrast, OpenStack and its 
services fulfill most of the ENISA criteria partially.  
The results show two main outcomes:  
• OpenStack does not address the P.G. of IR, whilst in 
vCloud and vSphere it is natively implemented and 
applicable. 
• In both, VMware and OpenStack the DLCM is only 
partially implemented. 
 
Hence the contribution is twofold, first we identify a set of 
topics that still require research and development (e.g.: IR, 
DLCM) and secondly, as a practical output, we provide a 
comparison of popular industrial and open-source platforms 
focusing on private cloud environments, which are important 
for Industry 4.0 use cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this work, due to the broad applicability of ENISA, the 
focus lies on the evaluation of ENISA guidelines concerning 
security assessment of IaaS solutions. The extracted set of 
security parameters is used for the assessment of the industrial 
VMware platform and the open source OpenStack platform. 
The results of the assessment have shown a high 
applicability of ENISA criteria on the VMware vCloud, where 
only one P.G. is met partially. In contrast to VMware vCloud, 
OpenStack fulfills most of the parameter groups only partially, 
but only one is not fulfilled at all. Compared to the existing 
work, the evaluation shows another way for assessing IaaS 
platforms. The results show the different levels of applicability 
of ENISA criteria on an industrial platform, where we expected 
a lot of features, and on an open source platform, which 
provides many modules from the open source community.  
The results are a first step towards the technical definition 
of a security baseline for IaaS cloud back-ends, which can be 
used for Industry 4.0 environments. Furthermore, we have 
identified a lack of support of IR and of DLCM in IaaS 
platforms, suggesting a need for research in these topics. To 
confirm this, future work will investigate current cloud 
research projects, to find out how well the research community 
supports this Industry 4.0 related issues. Additionally, we will 
include a wider set of guidelines to create a more 
comprehensive catalog. 
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